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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND USE REGULATION: A 
COMPARATIVE EVALUATION 
 




This paper reviews the rationale for policies aimed at limiting the conversion of farmland to non-
farm uses from the perspective of the economic theory of property rights. Policy measures to 
restrict the conversion of agricultural land to non-farm uses are commonplace in many 
countries. Typically, these policies are introduced to address long-run food security issues and 
possible externalities associated with incompatibility in land uses. 
 
The paper argues that the presence of externalities in the land market does not warrant farmland 
protection policies. Farmland protection policies in themselves can be a source of policy failure. It 
concludes that well-defined property rights along with nuisance and trespass laws, are necessary 
and sufficient for efficient allocation of land and can be a better alternative to farmland 
protection policies.  
 
EIENDOMSREGTE EN GRONDGEBRUIK REGULASIES: ‘N VERGELYKENDE 
EVALUASIE 
 
Hierdie navorsing gee ‘n oorsig oor beleid gemik op die omskakeling van boerderygrond na ander 
grondgebruike vanuit die ekonomiese teorie van eiendomsreg. Die argument word gevoer dat die 





Public concern about conversion of farmland to other uses has prompted many 
governments to interfere with market transactions in the allocation of agricultural 
land. Such interference involves the institution of laws and regulations like the 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act  (in South Africa) and zoning by-laws. Land 
use regulation can limit land to agricultural, residential, commercial or industrial 
uses. It can also limit the densities of use on such land, prohibit certain types of 
activities, specify the minimum lot size or maximum heights of buildings.  
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The problem of land allocation is linked to the issue of scarcity. The pressure to 
change property rights emerges as a resource becomes increasingly scarce relative 
to society's wants and as the consequences of harmful interdependence become 
more apparent (North & Thomas, 1973 and Demsetz, 1967). In a land abundant 
society, land allocation is not a problem, since parcels of land are always 
available for use.  
 
The economic debate since Pigou (1920) and Coase (1960), as to whether the 
government can do better in the allocation of resources compared to the free 
market, continues. The concept of externality3 has been at the centre of the debate. 
Pigou (1920) argued that government intervention is needed to correct externality 
problems. Coase (1960) on the other hand, stated that the presence of externality 
does not necessarily imply that government intervention is warranted.  
 
The other alternative to government intervention is the establishment of well-
defined property rights structure. Hayek (1945) concluded that the structure of 
ownership of property matters in resource allocation. Demsetz (1967), Barzel 
(1989), North (1990), Osterfeld (1992) and many other economists and 
philosophers have reached similar conclusions as Hayek & Coase on the 
relationship between property rights and resource allocation. Grunebaum (1987) 
outlined the importance of property rights and argued that forms of ownership 
affect society's economic organisation differently. How society produces and 
sustains itself is based on the existing ownership regime.  
 
Brubaker (1995), stated that traditional common law property rights, together 
with nuisance and trespass laws, shielded the environmental interest of property 
owners from those who would attack them and that rights brought with them 
strict environmental responsibility. Brubaker further asserted that, at the 
minimum, trespass law will remain a powerful tool for protecting oneself against 
visible encroachment and where it fails as a remedy for environmental wrongs, 
nuisance law, which has traditionally dealt with less material infractions, may 
succeed.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the rationale for policies aimed at 
preventing farmland from being converted to non-agricultural uses from the 
perspective of the economic theory of property rights and to propose that other
                     
3  Externality is said to exist whenever somebody’s actions unintentionally impose costs or 
benefits to someone else. Demsetz (1967) has argued that externality is an ambiguous 




alternatives to farmland protection policies exist for efficient4 land allocation.  
 
2.  PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OWNERSHIP 
 
Property rights and ownership have been defined from different perspectives. 
Three different theories of property rights have been employed in the political 
economic literature; Legal Positivism, Classical Liberalism and Utilitarianism. A 
discussion of these different theories of property rights is important because the 
result of any economic analysis of land ownership and regulation is determined 
by the theory of property rights employed. 
 
2.1  Legal positivist theory of property rights 
 
Legal positivists talk about property rights as originating from the existing 
legislation and consisting of a bundle of rights that change with changes in the 
legislation. In other words, legal positivists argue that property rights exist 
whenever there is a legislation that outlines duties and bind individuals to those 
duties. Hallowell (1943), Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop (1975) and Bromley (1992) 
have defined property as a social relationship involving benefit streams, right 
holders and duty bearers. Randall (1987) also defined property rights as the 
proper relationships among people with respect to the use of resources and the 
penalties for violating those proper relationships. Bromley (1991) further defines 
rights as the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one's claim to a 
benefit stream. Different rights may be distributed in various combinations 
among natural and legal persons, groups and several publics, including the many 
units of government (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, 1975). Randall (1987) also 
defined ownership as a legal device that assigns the right to use. 
 
The legal positivist considers rights as transitory and that rights change with 
changes in legislation. The respect for individual rights and the legislation 
required to ensure that those rights are respected, differentiates the legal 
positivist from the classical liberal and the utilitarian.  
 
2.2  Classical liberal theory of property rights 
 
Classical liberals argue that a property right is an unalienated right in the use and 
transfer of something owned. They believe that social welfare can only be realised 
through the process of voluntary exchange (Rothbard, 1977). The rights regarding 
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the institution of property influence the economic decisions that individuals 
make (Barnett, 1992). Barzel (1989) defined property rights over an asset as the 
rights or powers to consume obtain income from and alienate that asset. 
 
Fox (1994) defined ownership as the power to exclude. Thus, a property owner 
has the power to exclude others from the use of what he owns. When there is no 
power to exclude in the use of a given resource, then there is no ownership. 
Ownership carries with it the right to use. Becker (1977) also defined ownership 
as the right to use, transfer and exclude others from the property owned.  
 
Grunebaum (1987) argued that resources that are owned can be considered the 
object of the ownership relation. The persons who are capable of owning 
resources can be considered the subject of the relation, and the rights and duties 
can be considered the content of the relation. A specific form of ownership, 
therefore, is a unique combination of the subject, object and content of the relation 
from among the many possible ones. Thus, specific forms of ownership, for 
example, private and common property ownership, differ from each other in 
terms of the subject, object and the content of the relation. Variation is possible 
within the subject of the ownership relation. The set of possible objects may also 
vary from one specific form to another. The content of the ownership relation 
may also vary from one specific form to another. The rights and duties exercised 
over a given resource under a private or several property regime are different 
from that under common property regime. Owning something implies that the 
owner has rights over what he owns which non-owners lack.  
 
Unlike legal positivists and utilitarians, classical liberals do not consider rights as 
transitory and assert that no legislation is required in the allocation of rights. 
Classical liberals argue that if an individual owns a property, that individual has 
unalienated and unlimited rights to that property within its physical boundaries 
and must be allowed to exercise his rights with respect to the use of that 
property.  
 
2.3  Utilitarian theory of property rights 
 
The utilitarian considers property rights as a system of name tags that specify an 
individual's right to possession, use and disposition of property (Ivy and Fox, 
1996). Utilitarians also look at property rights as instruments in the distribution of 
rights between parties that will lead to the highest sum of utilities in society 
(Miceli & Segerson, 1994). Dale (1968) defined property as a bundle of potential 
utility-yielding services that can be used in alternative ways. Dale (1968) defined 
ownership as a bundle of legally-defined user rights to an asset. The utilitarian 




calculations and allocating rights on the basis of that calculation to maximise the 
total welfare in society.  
 
The utilitarian theory of property rights differs from the legal positivist in the 
sense that it considers the allocation of rights that will lead to social efficiency, 
whereas the legal positivist is only concerned with the respect for individual 
rights and the legislation required to ensure that those rights are respected. The 
Utilitarian theory also differs from the classical liberal theory of property rights in 
that the utilitarian theory considers rights as instruments for achieving social 
efficiency and transitory whereas the classical liberal theory considers rights as 
unalienated.  
 
The notion of rights advanced by the legal positivists and utilitarians as transitory 
may make it difficult for property owners to make long-term decisions over the 
efficient use of their property. This is because both legal positivists and 
utilitarians consider rights as transitory. This implies that a property owner's 
rights over a given property may change over time. There is also an information 
problem, in that a landowner may not be aware of conditions that will warrant 
social efficiency in the future, since he does not know how rights will be allocated 
and what legislation will exist for the allocation of rights. 
 
3.  THE STRUCTURE OF OWNERSHIP 
 
A clear-cut definition for various property regimes is very important in 
determining their economic implications and their relative efficiencies. Knight 
(1921) and Gordon (1954) demonstrated the role of ownership in resource 
allocation and adopted a property rights framework in analysing economic 
problems. Both Knight and Gordon, however, considered just two modes of 
ownership. These two modes of ownership are what present day economists refer 
to as private or several property ownership and open. Demsetz (1967), Hardin 
(1968), Dales (1968) and Weitzman (1974), following Knight and Gordon, have 
defined common property as no ownership. With the use of inconsistent 
definitions for various property regimes, it is difficult to interpret some research 
writings. The following section, is therefore, focussed on finding consistent 
definitions for various ownership structures and the relationships existing 
between them. There are basically four property regimes; Open Access, Common 
Property, Private Property and State Ownership.  
 
3.1 Open  access 
 
Open access is a situation where no one possesses the power to exclude. Thus, 




another from the use of the resource and the resource can belong to the party who 
first exercises control over it by using it. Without scarcity, a given resource may 
be in a state of no ownership. Demsetz (1967) has argued that if a resource is in 
abundant supply, diverse attempts to enjoy the benefit stream accruing from the 
use of the resource can be undertaken without conflict. With no scarcity, asset-
units5 can be large. As asset-units increase in size, it becomes more difficult to 
assign property rights. This is because of the high enforcement cost that may be 
associated with larger asset-units. Open access can therefore result from a 
situation where the enforcement of property rights is impossible or costly. Open 
access can also result from the absence or breakdown of an authority system 
whose very purpose was to assure compliance with the set of behavioural 
conditions about the resource (Bromley, 1992). A given resource regime can 
become open access through a series of institutional failures. As discussed above, 
there will be no ownership if property rights cannot be enforced.  
 
3.2 Common  property 
 
A common property resource is one for which the power to exclude is vested in 
the group in which membership is voluntary (Bromley, 1992). Ciriacy-Wantrup 
and Bishop (1975) also used common property to refer to a distribution of 
property rights in resources in which several owners share the rights to the use of 
resource. The common property groups are social units with definite membership 
and boundaries. Each social unit has certain common interests with at least some 
interaction among members, with common cultural norms and often with their 
own endogenous authority system (Bromley, 1991). For example, each member of 
a given family has the right to use a given family resource or property from 
which non-family members are excluded. A common property resource is 
therefore not available for use by everyone as in open access. Potential resource 
users who are not members of the group of owners are excluded from the use of 
the common property resource. Thus, common property is a management regime 
that closely resembles private property since all others are excluded from use and 
decision-making (Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, 1975). The property of excludability 
links common to private property. 
 
There is a critical difference between open access and common property 
ownership. In open access, there is the likelihood of using a given resource 
without considering the future benefits. Individuals do not manage the resources 
and the benefit streams because someone else may benefit from his management 
activities. In common property there is a well-defined group whose membership 
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is restricted. With open access, however, membership is unrestricted. There is 
also the need for group management of both the resources and the annual stream 
of benefits to make sure that the system continues to yield benefits to the group. 
Common property involves excludability of non-owners with open access 
characterised by non-excludability. In other words, the group can exclude non-
members from using and benefiting from the property. 
 
3.3 Private  ownership 
 
Private property regime involves ownership by one individual. The individual 
has the right to exclude non-owners from using the resource. Common property 
is just private ownership by a group. The main difference between private 
ownership that distinguishes it from common property is that there is usually 
one owner in private property but more than one owner in common property. 
This has some impacts on the transaction costs involved in the exchange of 
property. When a group has joint rights to an asset, an individual who wishes to 
acquire rights to that asset must negotiate with all individuals in the group. The 
group nature of common property ownership thus increases the transaction costs 
relative to private property ownership. 
 
The classical liberals argue that the rights regarding the institution of private 
property influence the economic decisions that individuals make (Barnett, 1992). 
In that regard, the inalienable right to private property functions as an institution 
that protects the least cost method of organising economic association amongst 
individuals (Ivy & Fox, 1996). 
 
3.4 State  ownership 
 
Bromley (1992) and Fox (1992, 1994) have discussed state ownership as another 
type of ownership structure. In state ownership, the power to exclude is vested in 
the state. The state has the right to exclude others from the use of the resource. 
However, the state often faces substantial political obstacles which limit the 
exercise of that power (Fox, 1992). This characteristic of state ownership 
differentiates it from open access. The fundamental difference between state 
ownership and common or private property is that the state possesses the powers 
to tax and take (Fox, 1992). Private or common property owners, on the other 
hand, have no power to tax. The ability to tax allows the state to offset losses. The 
power to tax acts as a disincentive for efficient management of resources. 
 
3.5  Characteristics and relationship between different ownership structures 
 




the evolution of different societies. What was known as open access fisheries can 
no more be referred to as open access. This is because government regulations 
have caused some individuals to be excluded from fishing. Government 
regulations in fishery can also create fishing rights that are transferable. Such 
government regulations change an open access resource into state ownership. 
Private ownership, in reality, may not exist since private owners in most cases do 
not have unrestricted rights within the physical boundaries of what they own. A 
good example is land ownership in North America. Government policies in 
North America over land use prevent private landowners from exercising their 
full rights over the use of the land they own. This is just state ownership of some 
of the attributes of land.  
 
Table 1 below summarises the characteristics of the different ownership 
structures in terms of power to exclude, transaction costs and ability to tax. The 
table identifies three types of transaction costs; search, negotiation and 
enforcement costs. Exchange requires information. Such information includes the 
identification and location of potential buyers and sellers, ascertaining the terms 
on which they are prepared to trade and checking the quality of the property to 
be exchanged and the bundle of rights attached to it. The cost of obtaining such 
information is what is referred to as search cost. Negotiation cost involves the 
cost of bargaining and agreeing on some terms of trade. Enforcement cost is the 
cost involved in ensuring that no trading partner reneges on the terms of trade 
agreed on.  
 
Relative performance of each ownership structure varies with each factor. Table 1 
indicates that a private property owner has high power to exclude, relatively low 
search, negotiation and enforcement costs and no power to tax. Common 
property owners also have high powers to exclude. This power to exclude is 
vested in the group. Each member of the group has limited powers to exclude. 
With common property ownership, the size of the group influences the 
enforcement and transaction costs. Common property owners may have rules 
with regard to the use of their property. As the size of the group increases, more 
effort may be needed to ensure that each member of the group respects and obeys 
those rules. The costs of searching, negotiating and enforcement may therefore 
increase as the size of the group of owners increases. The costs of transactions 
may therefore be moderate relative to that of a private property regime and may 
increase with increases in the size of the group. Common property owners also 
have limited powers to tax. The state has high power to tax. Since there is 
proliferation of stakeholders, state ownership involves high negotiation and 
enforcement costs. The search cost, however, is low and depends on the 
ambiguity of jurisdiction (Fox, 1994).  




Table 1:  Characteristics of different ownership structures 
 
  Private property  Common property  State property  Open access 
Power to Exclude  High  High  High  No power to exclude 
Search cost  Low to moderate  Moderate – Depends 
on size and 
cohesiveness of group 
Low – Depends on 
the ambiguity or 
clarity of jurisdiction 
Very High- Involves 
several people 
Negotiation cost  Low  Moderate - Depends 
on size and 
cohesiveness of group 
High  Very high – Has to 
negotiate with 
everyone 
Enforcement cost  Low    High – Limited 
enforceability of 
promises 
Very high – involves 
everyone 
Power to tax  No  No  Yes  No 




In open access, there is no power to exclude, with high search, negotiation and 
enforcement costs. From the point of view of the legal positivist, there is no 
property in open access and therefore nothing to negotiate for and consequently 
no negotiation costs. This is because the legal positivists define property as a 
social relationship involving benefit streams (Hallowell, 1943, Ciriacy-Wantrup & 
Bishop, 1975 and Bromley, 1992). However, following the classical liberals' notion 
of property, we will define property as the "object" or "thing" over which rights 
can be assigned and argue that there is a property in open access, for which 
everyone has the right to use but no one has the power to exclude someone else 
from using it. An open access resource can belong to the party who first exercises 
control over the resource by using it. As soon as a party legally exercises control 
over an open access resource, the resource can no longer be regarded as an open 
access resource. However, the possibility of several parties claiming to be the first 
to exercise control over a given resource is high. To allocate the rights to use of 
the resource will therefore involve a high negotiation cost. Demsetz (1964), has 
argued that if land and resources are communally owned6, then resources will be 
depleted quickly. However, communal owners could undertake negotiated 
agreements to slow depletion, but as Demsetz further argues, the costs of 
negotiations can be high.  
 
This discussion does not necessarily imply that everything should be privately 
owned. Clearly there is no requirement that things that are not economic goods 
be privately owned (Fox, 1994 and Demsetz, 1967). 
 
4.  THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
In this section, we will adopt the classical liberal theory of property rights in 
explaining and exploring the relationships between ownership structure and the 
exchange process, externalities, input use and economic growth in an attempt to 
answer the question of whether property rights matter in resource allocation. 
This is because classical liberal theory of rights does not call for legislation to 
allocate rights and does not look at rights as transitory but inalienable.  
 
4.1  Property rights and the exchange process 
 
The classical liberal asserts that it is through a system of voluntary transfer can it 
be said that society is better off as a result of exchange (Rothbard, 1977). The 
classical liberal further argues that the inalienable right to private property 
functions as an institution that protects the least cost method of organising 
economic association amongst individuals (Ivy and Fox, 1996). One can transfer 
                     




rights over a given parcel of land to someone else in exchange for something, for 
example money. Thus, one can sell land to someone if he has the right to transfer 
the land. Without this right there will be no incentive to exchange since no one 
will own anything and no one will be prevented from using what someone 
possesses (i.e. the individual has no rig h t  t o  e x c l u d e  o t h e r s  f r o m  w h a t  h e  
possesses). Also, since no gains from exchange will occur if there are no rights to 
title, there will be no reason to exchange. Under open access, where no one has 
the power to exclude others from the use of a given property, efficient exchange 
is not possible. Where individuals have the inalienable right to use and sell what 
they own, efficient exchange can take place. The right to exchange is not 
necessarily contained in all rights of title since some specific forms of ownership 
limit the kinds of objects that can be exchanged. Any system that limits what can 
be exchanged will not lead to efficiency because in the process of coerced 
exchange, at least one person will be left worse off (Rothbard, 1977). The classical 
liberal argues that any government action that violates an individual's right to 
possession, use and exchange of property, cannot be said to be pareto superior 
since at least one person will be worse off than before. This is because 
government actions do not allow for voluntary exchange. 
 
A market is an institution in which individuals or groups of people exchange 
property. The neo-classical economic notion of efficiency focuses on a perfectly 
competitive general equilibrium. Perfectly competitive equilibrium is 
characterised by homogeneity of products, many firms and perfect knowledge. 
Transaction costs are also assumed to be zero. When there is perfect competition, 
prices are enough to allocate resources to their highest-valued uses. The efficiency 
problem is one of allocating resources to their highest valued use, implying a 
single scale of values upon which comparisons can be made (Cordato, 1992). In 
the real world, however, products are not completely homogenous and 
individual consumers and producers are not fully informed. Two stores may sell 
identical shoes at different prices. If everyone is fully informed, then no one will 
buy shoes from the store with higher prices. If marginal rates of substitution are 
not the same for individuals over the allocation of resources, then an inefficient 
allocation is said to exist. If there is inefficiency, then mutually advantageous 
exchange could not take place. The question then is, why is exchange not taking 
place if it is advantageous to the parties involved. Inefficiencies may persist 
because of incomplete control over assets, information asymmetry and high 
transaction costs. These factors are inter-related.  
 
Incomplete control over assets hinders the exchange process. North & Thomas 
(1973), have stated that by providing the proper incentives, a fully efficient 
economic organisation would ensure that the private and social rates of return 




activities. Each individual has the exclusive right to use as the individual sees fit 
his/her land, labour, capital and other possessions and that he/she alone has the 
right to transfer the resources to another person. If the power to exclude and 
transfer is not complete, then exchange of property cannot take place efficiently. 
 
Besides the resources used in directly producing goods, resources are also used in 
exchanging these goods. The transfer of goods between economic agents requires 
the provision of information about the opportunities for exchange, negotiation of 
the terms of exchange and determining procedures for enforcing the contract 
(North and Thomas, 1973). The cost of providing all the services involved is 
termed transaction costs. In the Walrasian perfectly competitive equilibrium 
model, zero transaction costs are assumed. In reality, transaction costs are not 
zero, because people are not fully informed regarding the exchanged 
commodities, and the terms of trade are not always perfectly clear. High 
transaction costs have the potential of preventing full transfer of property. When 
a group has rights over an asset, an individual who wishes to acquire the right to 
that asset must negotiate with all individuals in the group. Each individual in the 
group may attach different values to the asset. This will mean high transaction 
cost and may lead to incomplete transfer of property relative to a world of full 
information.  
 
4.2  Property rights and externalities 
 
With imperfectly defined or enforced property rights, private and social returns 
in some activities diverge because some of the benefits or costs due to an 
individual who uses or transfers his resources will accrue to a third party. If such 
benefits or costs accruing to a third party are not compensated for, then 
externalities are said to exist. Externalities prevent resources from moving to their 
most valued uses (Demsetz 1967). Demsetz further argued that the primary 
function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to internalise 
externalities7. Dales (1968) agrees with Demsetz's assertion by stating that the 
existence of a natural pricing system depends crucially on the institution of 
ownership. Dales further explained that the great virtue of the pricing system is 
that it solves and avoids all sorts of complexities, particularly those that arise 
from various interdependencies between uses and users of goods. Demsetz (1967) 
again asserted that, all that is needed for internalisation of externalities is 
ownership which includes the right of sale, and the output mix that results when 
the exchange of property rights is allowed is efficient and independent of who is 
assigned ownership.  
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Demsetz (1967) argued that if a single person owns land, he/she will attempt to 
maximise the present value by considering alternative future time stream of 
benefits and costs. He/she will then select that one which he/she believes will 
maximise the present value of his/her privately-owned land. A private 
landowner acts as a broker whose wealth depends on how well he considers the 
competing claims of the present and the future. On the other hand, in open 
access, there is no broker and the claims of the present generation will be given 
an uneconomically large weight in determining the intensity of land use or 
resource use (Demsetz, 1967). Thus, the effect of a person's activities on his 
neighbours and on subsequent generations will not be taken into account in open 
access decision making. Maximisation of benefits from resource use in open 
access will take place as long as average revenue is not exceeded by average cost. 
This is because the individual has no right to exclude others from enjoying the 
benefits from his efforts. With private property rights, the owner can efficiently 
manage those resources from which he has the right to exclude others. 
Internalisation of externalities is, therefore, accomplished under private property 
regime. The cost of negotiating over externalities will also be reduced under 
private property regime. 
 
The externalities that accompany private ownership of property do not affect all 
owners. Demsetz (1967), following Coase (1960), asserted that it will therefore be 
necessary for only a few owners to reach an agreement that takes these effects 
into account. Taking a common property regime, the increase in number of 
individuals within the group will lead to an increase in the cost of internalisation. 
Thus, as the number of individuals in the group that manages a common 
property increases, the degree of externalities approaches that of open access 
regime. Conversely, as the number decreases, the degree of externalities 
approaches that of a private property regime. The source of an externality is 
typically to be found without fully defined property rights. The implication is 
that in some instances a detrimental externality can be eliminated, by redefining 
property rights appropriately.  
 
4.3  Property rights and input use 
 
Apart from the imposition of taxes with the view of correcting for externalities, 
the state can also offset losses by imposing taxes on citizens. Consequently, the 
need to manage property efficiently by the state is reduced. Thus, the state can 
decide to use less or more of a given resource relative to the optimal level. Open 
access is also characterised by overcrowding. Since no rents or tolls are paid, 
firms will apply their variable inputs to any property which offers them the 





Taking for instance a fertile land with no owner, each firm will apply variable 
inputs to the land and that will lead to overcrowding on that piece of land. This is 
similar to what Hardin (1968) referred to as the “Tragedy of the Commons”. This 
is a situation where there is a pasture land opened to all herdsmen. As with any 
businessman, each herdsman’s goal is to maximise his/her gains. It is therefore 
expected that each herdsman will try and keep as many cattle as he/she can on 
the common pastureland in order to maximise gains. Each herdsman will 
continue adding one additional cattle to his/her herd till the point where he/she 
can no longer improved his/her gains. Hardin (1968), further argued that there is 
the strategy where each herdsman is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited. This strategy of 
increasing herd count will lead to overgrazing and consequently erosion and 
other environmental problems. This can be averted by institution of private 
property or something formerly like it (Hardin, 1968). Under private ownership 
regime, however, the fertile land or pastureland will mean paying a 
competitively rental rate. The rental rate will deter some firms or herdsmen from 
using the land. This will therefore reduce the chances of overcrowding. 
 
Weiztman (1974) developed a formal model to characterise and compare 
alternative static allocations of resources which occur under conditions of open 
access and private property. He assumed n pieces of resources or property with 
each acting as a fixed factor in the production of an output when combined with 
a variable factor, X. Weiztman then used the model to characterise open access 
and private property regimes and concluded that, under an open access regime, 
firms will produce where product price is equated to the value of average 
product. Weitzman explained that competitive variable input units can and will 
move freely to that property which offers them the highest product per unit 
under open access regime. Therefore independent units of the variable factor 
ignore the effects of their actions on the average product of others in considering 
only the product they stand to gain or loose by a proposed change. This usually 
results in the creation of external costs to others. Under an open access 
competitive equilibrium, a variable factor is allocated such that there is 
equalisation of average product on all properties that are used. Weiztman further 
explained that with private ownership in perfectly competitive markets, the 
marginal value product of the variable factor is equated to its price. In this case, 
the variable factor will be hired at a competitive price and self interested renters 
will hire that amount of variable input which maximises their profits.  
 
Under open access, individuals or firms do not think about the discounted 
benefits that can be obtained in future. This is because if they do not use the 




fisheries, for instance, open access can result in overfishing and even extinction. 
Consider an ocean in which every individual can fish freely. A catch of one unit 
of fish by any one individual has the effect of reducing the expected catch to the 
others. Thus one additional unit of fish taken out of the ocean imposes an extra 
cost on any additional unit of fishing effort. The result of individual maximising 
behaviour in this case will be an excessive level of fishing activity. An 
individual's fishing activity imposes cost to other fishermen and thereby 
generates a marginal social yield lower than the value of marginal product in 
other activities. This leads to the generation of a detrimental externality which 
can be corrected by transferring the ocean from the public to a private owner. The 
private owner will employ fishermen up to the point where the value of his 
marginal product is equal to the wage he pays to these fishermen and this 
outcome will be socially efficient. This can be applied to all non-renewable 
resources, for example oil drilling in an open access regime.  
 
5.  WHY LAND USE REGULATION?  
 
In this section we will discuss how farmland protection policies affect ownership 
of land and the implications to efficiency in the land market.  
 
Government regulation of private lands is common in many countries. 
Government regulation of private lands usually involves the institution of 
farmland protection policies. One reason for farmland protection policies is the 
elimination of incompatible land uses. Incompatible land uses occur when the 
use decision of a landowner imposes a disservice on users of adjacent parcels of 
land. This is what economists term externality, which is a potential source of 
market failure. An example is when a pig farmer is located on land adjacent to a 
residential area. The pig farm generates noise, odour, dust and polluted run-off 
which affects the residents in the area. This activity of the farmer, however, may 
not be considered an incompatible land use or an externality if a non-farm 
resident is not located close to the farmer.  
 
Externalities exist in the land market, but this may or may not prevent optimal 
allocation of land resource to the extent of warranting farmland protection 
policies. Coase (1960) suggested that the existence of externalities does not 
necessarily warrant government regulation. Coase stated that in the absence of 
transaction costs all externalities are internalised, regardless of the initial 
assignment of property rights. Bargaining or negotiations between parties would 
lead to arrangements being made that would maximise wealth regardless of the 
initial assignment of rights. Followers of Pigou, however, do not agree with 
Coase's assertion and argue that the government should intervene to correct 




farmland protection policies in internalising externalities in the land market 
relative to free market with well-defined property rights. 
 
Land is a fixed resource subject to competing demands. Let’s assume a 
downward sloping demand curve for both agricultural and non-agricultural land 
markets. If property rights are well defined, demand for land for agriculture and 
non-agricultural uses will interact to determine price of land. The demand for 
land will represent the marginal value product of the land. As the marginal value 
product of land in agriculture increases, more land will be demanded for 
agriculture and as the marginal value product of land for non-agricultural 
development increases more land will be demanded for non-agricultural 
development. Since land is a fixed resource, changes in demand for land for 
different uses will cause land to be transferred from one use to another. As 













Df represents the demand for farmland.  
Dn represents the demand for non-farmland. 
R is the equilibrium price for land. 
 
Figure 1:  Competitive land allocation 
 
farmland intersect to determine the price of land. As the demand for farmland 
and non-farmland changes, the price of land will also respond by changing.  
Total amount of land 
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A shift in the demand for farmland, for example, will result in the establishment 
of a new equilibrium price. Thus, land will move to its highest-valued use 
without farmland protection policies. 
 
Farmland protection policies restrict private landowners’ rights to exclude and 
exchange land. It may prevent the price mechanism from operating and thus lead 
to policy failure. As illustrated in Figure 2, farmland protection policies can lead 
to the establishment of different price levels for competing land uses. Price of 
farmland may be lower than the price of non-farmland. This is because it will 
c a u s e  m o r e  l a n d  t o  b e  c o n s e r v e d  f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  w i t h  a  s m a l l  
proportion of the total land area distributed among other land uses. Figure 1 
further illustrates that a shadow value8 will result with farmland protection 
policies. The shadow value indicates that there is a potential for exchange. A 
simple example can be used to illustrate this. Let us assume that the average 
farmland rental rate in a given township is R1500 per ha per year, and that 
farmland protection policies lead to the preservation of 500 ha9 of land in the 
township. Let us also assume that the purchase price of land used for non-farm 
purposes is R50,000 per ha and that the purchase price of non-farmland is the 
benefits expected to accrue over an infinite period of time. In order to make the 
purchase price of non-agricultural land comparable to the farmland rental rate, 
the R50,000 value should be annualised. Assuming a 10% discount rate, the rental 
value for non-farmland can be computed to be R5000 per ha per year. With this 
scenario, the price wedge between farmland and non-farmland is R3500 per ha 
per year. If exchange is allowed to take place, land will be transferred to the 
higher value use. Unrestricted exchange will also lead to an equilibrium farmland 
rental rate higher than R1500 and lower than R5000 per ha per year. However 
farmland policies restrict transfer of land and may prevent efficient allocation of 
land among competing uses. Assuming that the demand functions in Figure 1 are 
linear, this example will imply a shadow value of R875,00010 per year for the 
township. This, however, does not imply that farmland protection policies are not 
justified. This shadow value must be compared to the benefits of farmland 
protection policies, such as future food security and preservation of amenity 
benefits. The policy however, can be considered to allocate land efficiently only if 
                     
8  Shadow value is used here to refer to the benefits that could be obtained from forgone 
alternatives. It can also be considered the social cost of farmland protection policies.  
9  This is the extra amount of land kept in farms as a result of the policy over the equilibrium 
amount under a free market situation and corresponds to Lf -Lf* of Figure 2. 
10  This can be represented as the shaded area of Figure 2, where in this example Rn =R5000/ha, 
Rf  =R1500/ha, Lf  -Lf*=500 ha. The shadow value or social cost is thus computed as 




the discounted sum of the benefits associated with preserving the 500 ha land is 















Df represents the demand for farmland.  
Dn represents the demand for non-farmland. 
Rf is the observed price for farmland. 
Rn is the observed price for non-farmland 
Lf is the observed quantity of farmland 
Lf * is the equilibrium quantity of farmland 
 
Figure 2:  Effects of land use policies on land allocation 
 
6.  COMMON LAW PROPERTY RIGHTS VERSUS LAND USE 
REGULATION 
 
In this section, we will discuss common law rights and argue that private 
property rights backed by common law, is a better alternative to land use 
regulation in internalising externalities in the land market.  
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Law can either be imposed from above by some coercive authority, such as the 
king, a legislature or the supreme court, or law can develop from the "ground" as 
customs and practice evolve. According to Benson (1990), law imposed from 
above; authoritarian or statute law, typically requires the support of a powerful 
minority, whereas law developed from the bottom up; common or customary 
law, requires widespread acceptance.  Common law is the body of rules 
established by judges over the years and intended primarily to be a tool for 
resolving disputes between individuals. Statute law, on the other hand, refers to 
laws passed by elected representatives in the provincial legislature or federal 
parliament. Estrin & Swaigen (1993), simplified this by describing common law 
as private law and statute law as public law. Some statute laws are used to 
regulate land uses in most provinces in Canada and many other western 
countries. 
 
Customary law or common law is recognised not because it is backed by the 
power of some strong individual or institution, but because each individual 
recognises the benefits of behaving in accordance with other individual's 
expectations, given that others also behave as he expects (Benson, 1990). Benson 
further asserted that the alternative to common law, statute law, will require 
much more force to maintain social order than is required when law develops 
from the bottom through mutual recognition and acceptance. Under customary 
law, offences are treated as torts11 and not crimes or offences against the state and 
a potential action by one person has to affect someone else before any question of 
legality can arise (Benson, 1990).  
 
There are many common law tools12 that can be used, in the place of land use 
regulation and other statute laws, to prevent or obtain damages from 
incompatible land uses or environmental wrongs. Prior to the rise of 
governmental controls, land uses were regulated through suits in common law, 
especially trespass and nuisance and private covenants. Covenants that remain 
common today, are contracts between buyers and sellers restricting the uses of 
property. Uses damaging to adjoining property owners may be eliminate by the 
entire neighbourhood through private covenants attached to property deeds 
(Coyle, 1993). As stated by Estrin & Swaigen (1993) nuisance is the most common 
law tool used to address air and water pollution, noise, vibration, smells, soil 
contamination, flooding and many other intrusions upon the peaceful use and 
enjoyment of one's land or property. Estrin & Swaigen further discussed two 
types of nuisance; private and public nuisance. A private nuisance consists of the 
unreasonable interference with another's use or enjoyment of land he or she owns 
                     
11  These are private wrongs or injuries. 




or occupies. The reasonableness of the interference depends largely on the degree 
of impact that it has on a neighbour's enjoyment of his or her land or property, 
rather than on how useful, necessary, or diligent the offending activity. Public 
nuisances are also activities that unreasonably interfere with the public's use of 
public lands and waters, obstruct the access of occupants of neighbouring lands 
to the public land, or interfere with people's access to premises adjacent to public 
lands. 
 
The common law of trespass refers to the physical intrusion of people or objects 
onto one's land, or even over it without the consent of the owner or occupant 
(Estrin & Swaigen, 1993). Under common law, it is a trespass to place anything on 
someone else's land. With an intentional intrusion, the intruder is liable for any 
harm that results directly from the intrusion. The intentional trespasser is liable 
for any damage done while on the land even if his or her motives are good (Estrin 
& Swaigen, 1993).  
 
Since each member of a society recognises customary law, private property rights 
and the rights of individuals are likely to constitute the most important primary 
rules of conduct in legal systems (Benson, 1990). This is because voluntary 
recognition of laws and participation in their enforcement is likely to arise only 
when substantial benefits from doing so can be internalised.  
 
Brubaker (1995) also suggested that owners of transferable property rights can do 
better than governments, and questions whether the current property system is 
up to the job of preserving resources and protecting the environment. The free 
market environmentalism school argues that there is nothing special about the 
environment that cannot best be protected through the market. Individuals who 
are disturbed by the effects on the environment can respond through the market, 
which will force them to pay the full social cost for their preferences. Brubaker 
(1995) had argued that rather than passing laws by the legislature, common law 
property rights which have evolved in the courts through the ages, can function 
as environmental protection laws. 
 
The police power, which allows the government to regulate private property and 
the power of eminent domain which allows government to take property are the 
chief legal tools by which state control is exercised. Paul (1987), along with other 
libertarians, argued that these coercive powers destroy community and 
individual satisfaction. Siegan (1980), stated that there is no greater public interest 
than the rights of individuals to be secured against the state. Epstein (1985), 
argued that any diminution of the rights to possess, alienate or use property is a 
taking that must be compensated by the state. Individual property rights are a 




procedural hurdles and substantive outcomes from becoming too abusive (Coyle, 
1993). Coyle (1993), further argued that, statutes or local ordinances that 
authorises land uses or provide procedural safeguards may benefit property 
owners, but rights imply a moral foundation and a permanence that do not 
characterise the pragmatic legislative compromises of shifting political forces.  
 
The common law remedies discussed above are not without problems. Estrin & 
Swaigen (1993) discussed some drawbacks of the common law rights and 
asserted that exercising one's common law rights is expensive and often takes 
several years. They further argued that the outcomes of common law remedies 
are often uncertain. This is because it is difficult to predict what a court will 
consider reasonable or unreasonable. On the contrary, with common law rights, 
when a dispute arises, the parties involve must expect the benefits of resolving 
the dispute and establishing a new rule through the courts to outweigh the cost of 
resolving the dispute and enforcing the resulting judgement or they would not go 
to court but try to resolve the dispute through negotiations. Also if an individual 
landowner knows that, under the common law, he/she is liable for damages 
caused to his/her neighbouring land owner and that such damages would far 
exceed the benefits he/she gains for that particular action, he/she would avoid 
that damage by not proceeding with that action. Put another way, a well-defined 
property rights system, backed by common law, governs who has the right to use 
land and the environment in which ways, establishes who must pay whom in 
order to exploit or protect land and other resources and influences the costs that 
polluters and trespassers must take into account before making decisions. These 
can lead to more internalisation of externalities than farmland protection policies 




This paper establishes the relationship between property rights and efficiency. 
Properly defined property rights are necessary for efficient allocation of resource. 
A property rights system which is not well-defined is characterised by high 
external and transaction costs. The high transaction costs can hinder the exchange 
process. 
 
The paper also addresses the rationale for farmland protection policies and 
concludes that any restrictions on the use of land can adversely affect efficiency 
in the land market. Land is a fixed resource subject to competing uses. With 
properly defined property rights system, demand for land for various uses will 
interact to determine price. Farmland protection policies may not be able to solve 
the problems they are intended to; internalisation of externalities. It rather may 




well-defined property rights, bargaining and negotiations between parties can 
lead to much internalisation of the externalities. Farmland protection policies 
may be efficient in the long-run if the sum of the discounted benefits from the 
preservation of land is equal or greater than the sum of the discounted dead-
weight losses.  
 
In general, regulation of land ownership restricts freedom of expression, erodes 
personal privacy and creates obstacles for economic opportunities and growth. 
The other alternative to farmland protection policies is the use of common law 
property rights, nuisance and trespass laws which have evolved in the courts 
through the ages.  
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